world needs Iran's oil: Expert

1. Alena Douhan UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Iran who was invited by Islamic Republic of Iran center for Human right, visited Iran in April this year. In her official report of her visit, she has insisted that unilateral sanctions against Iran are not in conformity with legal principals and a frame work for determining a mechanism for paying compensation to the victims of violation of human rights by this unilateral actions must be created. How do you evaluate this report? Will this have an effect on actions of world powers? Can the mechanism mentioned by UN Special Rapporteur on human rights be implemented?

Indeed, resolution 27/21 of the Human Rights Council stressed that unilateral coercive measures are contrary to international law, the Charter, and the norms and principles governing peaceful relations among states. It also highlighted that these measures might result in social and humanitarian problems. There is an even older debate about the morality of sanctions that affect the entire society. Opponents would advocate tailored sanctions to hit the governing elites and avoid unnecessary citizen suffering. Proponents of broad sanctions see it as an essential element of maximum pressure on the government whose behavior they want to change. Today, we have the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act in force, sanctions against Russia due to the invasion of Ukraine, but also Russia’s countermeasures that threaten energy and social stability in Europe. Many people are suffering because of these measures, while cries for humanity are not yielding results.

Iran is under a broad and complex set of primary and secondary sanctions, which have led to resource scarcity and inflation, reduced state revenues, and increased poverty. The consequences are sad, but actually, they are the goal of the sanctions themselves – to limit the resources available to Tehran and to cause and fuel the discontent of the population of Iran. As UN Special Rapporteur stated, sanctions also led to a shortage of medical equipment in Iran. That is even sadder if we bear in mind that medicines and food are supposed to be exempted from sanctions by the decision of the US Office of Foreign Assets Control. However, it proved ineffective since Iran, besides trade sanctions, also faces those related to international financial transactions and shipments.

Will Rapporteur’s work have an impact on the actions of world powers? No, it won’t. I can hardly recall any case it ever did, even in the case of a much smaller state than the US. The report can help to spread the word about the negative impact that sanctions have on Iranians, but not to change the actions of a great power that intends to influence the behavior of its adversary through sanctions, as is the case with the US and Iran. Besides naming and blaming, the best that Iran can hope for is more concrete steps by US agencies to enable medicines and food to reach those who need them. Concerning other complaints, they will probably ignore them, especially those that insist on the lifting of unilateral sanctions. Iran can only expect a reduction in sanctions through a change in political behavior. Unfortunately, some aspects of international relations are brutal and will remain so for some time.

1. United States despite its claims that it supports human rights and people of Iran, in a situation that negotiations are suspended, it has imposed new sanctions against Iran. How do you evaluate this contradiction in America’s actions?  

Some American sanctions against Iran are as old as the Islamic Republic, and in case of renewing the Iranian nuclear deal, many will remain in force. The Biden administration will not be able to lift sanctions that require congressional approval. Some recently introduced sanctions are not directly related to countering Iran but to other adversaries, such as those implemented due to exporting Iranian drones to Russia. Some are part of the negotiating strategy of the US. Some recently implemented sanctions aim to put additional pressure on Iran and enhance the US negotiation position. Many of the non-nuclear sanctions introduced by President Biden’s executive orders could be removed as part of the deal revival. Seemingly contradictory to the negotiations, the Biden administration thus raises its bargaining capital for possible concessions with Iran. Since the more they sanction – the more they have to give up on, and the more they give up on – the more Iran will be willing to make a concession. Similar negotiation logic can be found behind Iran’s decisions to intensify uranium enrichment and put new centrifuges into operation.

1. What is your evaluation of the latest development regarding the release of two Iranian-American prisoners in Iran and United States allowing Iran to access its frozen funds? In your opinion will this have an impact on the current stalemate in nuclear talks between Iran and the West?

There is a long history of coinciding of the political actions of Iran with receiving funds from western countries. In 1991, Iran helped with the release of US hostages in Lebanon, while the Bush administration decided to pay some of the shah-era debts. During the 2016 JCPOA implementation, the Obama administration also paid some debts dating back to the rule of the Shah. In march 2022, Britain paid for some of the shah-era debts shortly after the release of two British citizens from prison in Iran. What these three cases have in common is that they have nothing to do with financial aid but the funds that belonged to Iran. Another common point is that the US and UK governments always have denied any connection between Iran’s actions and their decisions to give Tehran its money.

Now we have what we heard about earlier in April 2022 – the release of American citizens in exchange for the unfreezing of 7 billion $ Iranian funds trapped in South Korea. Once again, these funds belong to Iran, while the US government denies any link between releasing its nationals and unfreezing the funds. Part of the reason could be that the news about the release of American citizens would have a better reception by the American public than that it happened in exchange for financial compensation. Due to the approaching elections for the US Congress, the concern about the domestic reception of the deal is particularly significant today. The news about bowing to Iranian pressure would certainly not be well received. At this moment, American citizens have left Iran, but there is no information about the funds unfreezing in South Korea. Whether it is a gesture of goodwill by Iran, a political transaction, or the first stage of a broader exchange of prisoners, the consequences can only be positive. Although similar actions represent a model for long-term confidence-building and eventual pacification of relations between the US and Iran, it is hard to speak precisely about its impact on the deadlock in the nuclear negotiations. Nevertheless, it is an encouraging sign.

1. While European and American sides insisted on some of the initiative of Tehran and they were interacting to accept some clauses of agreement. Why all of these interactions were suddenly ignored?

The European Union is a bloc and a global actor interested in ending the negotiations more than other international parties involved. Currently, the EU is disturbed that after their proposal of the text of the final agreement and initial optimism, Iran renewed some of its unrealistic demands. More precisely, those related to guarantees that some future president will not pull the US out of the agreement and that the International Atomic Energy Agency close the investigation dating from 2003. There may be a personal element in the dissatisfaction of the EU since the draft text of a deal on Iran’s nuclear program was proposed by Josep Borrell, their High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. However, I am convinced that concern for the consequences of the ultimate breakdown of negotiations is the dominant reason for their anxiety. The EU is currently very sensitive to conflicts, and an escalatory spiral that risks triggering a military confrontation is likely in the event of a collapse of the JCPOA. On the other hand, the EU should put pressure on the US to offer some alternative solutions to Iran in exchange for Tehran’s giving up on some of the unrealistic demands, for example, lifting a broader scope of sanctions than was the case in the 2015 deal.

1. Some believe that since the beginning of the new round of negotiations, the Biden administration was hesitant to make necessary decisions and present negotiation initiatives to advance the negotiations, and now, as the congressional elections are approaching in November, they are under pressure. How do you evaluate this proposition?

There is no doubt that there was a lack of goodwill in America to reach an agreement during the first year of Biden’s presidency. For some time, there was the insistence on Iran returning to compliance before the US would go back to the 2015 deal, as well as an attempt to include ballistic missiles and Iran’s regional policy in the new agreement. The latter was not possible in 2015 and especially is not possible now when America’s credibility has been damaged by unilaterally leaving the JCPOA in 2018. Over time, these demands were abandoned, which facilitated the fact that today we are in a situation that allows the renewal of the deal. Since it would not be in the Democrats’ favor if the topic of the JCPOA would rate highly in the campaign for the elections for Congress, midterm elections in the US currently prevent the possibility of negotiations and reaching an agreement. Biden does face opposition in Washington when it comes to renewing the JCPOA. He faces the opposition that does not offer alternative solutions, except those that push Iran towards further development of nuclear program and weaponization, and America into war to prevent it. It turned out that the only result the policy of maximum pressure on Iran yielded was shortening Iran’s breakout time. Regardless of the results of the midterm elections,  the negotiators will probably have the last opportunity to reach an agreement after the elections. If another year gets wasted, it could be too late because the further development of the Iranian nuclear program poses some dangers while the American presidential elections are nearing.

1. Iran has announced that in order to prevent a repeat of the 2018 incident (Trump withdrawing from JCPOA), the United States must give a guarantee for the withdrawal of the parties from this agreement. How reasonable do you think this demand of Iran is?

The Biden administration will not have support in Congress for renewing the agreement as a legally-binding treaty. Once again, the best we can hope for is an agreement with the same level of mandatory power as the original JCPOA. On the other hand, the American political system does not allow the guarantees that Iran insists on – that some subsequent administration will not abandon the agreement as Trump did in 2018. I understand the concern in Tehran due to the possibility of such developments, which limits the very benefits that Iran could have from the lifting of sanctions. Although they will have formal permission to invest, many investors will be reluctant to do so because of fear that Washington could renew sanctions one day. But even so, I believe Iran has economic and political interests in reviving the agreement. I perceive Iran’s insistence on guarantees through the same logical frame I perceived the US demands to include ballistic missiles and Iran’s regional policy in the agreement. In both cases, I see such insistence as pressure on the other side to give up some of its irrational demands and possibly give more in return. Unfortunately, that stubborn policy has long led to unnecessary delays in negotiations. To conclude, the US will not provide Iran with guarantees for possible withdrawals in the future. Alternatively, some provisions that would increase the cost for the US to abandon the deal or some compensation for Iran if that occurs could be on the table.

1. Given the current situation what is your prediction of efforts put in to reviving the JCPOA?

Both sides should try harder, especially the US, as a side responsible for the collapse. The US should show global responsibility, especially since they insist on it when it comes to their international politics. But also, Iran should do the same in order to avoid the breakdown of the negotiations. The war in Ukraine complicated the situation significantly and reduced the threshold for the possible US military intervention against Iranian nuclear facilities. In the worst-case scenario of escalation of the war in Europe and if negotiations fail, I can imagine a world war front in the Middle East. If the US attacks, Iran would defend and retaliate, resulting in catastrophe and the energy collapse of the world. Some observers think that the American sensitivity to such a scenario is what Iran is precisely counting on. According to them, Iran will continue to delay negotiations until it builds a bomb, confident that the Americans will not attack. If that is the case, I seriously question the rationality behind this approach. By weaponizing its nuclear program, Iran would risk the destruction and war on its territory. If Tehran succeeds in making the bomb, Iran will become a pariah state, totally excluded from the world’s most important political and economic flows. That weapon would not give Iran any advantage in its regional policy but would enhance its security to a certain extent. However, is this additional security necessary, assuming that Iran’s conventional power and the global consequences of a war with Iran are a sufficient deterrent to any attack?! Without a good enough reason, which would probably be only concrete steps toward the weaponization of enriched uranium, I do not believe anyone would dare to attack Iran. Paradoxically, it seems that the search for more unnecessary security can endanger security. The dangers are more serious, and the possible consequences are even more tragic if we consider that intelligence sources can fail and misinterpret some Iranian activities as weaponization, which in periods of mistrust, could lead to the escalation of an unnecessary war. After the congressional elections in the US, it’s about time to save the JCPOA and avoid catastrophe.

1. In your opinion, what are the effect of reaching and not reaching an agreement on energy market? In case of not reaching an agreement, what are the implications for Europe given the fact that it has lost its major energy market (Russia)?

Reaching an agreement would mitigate to some extent the effects that the war in Ukraine caused on the global energy supply, although not decisively, given that it is less than 2 million barrels per day that Iran can put on the market in the short run. I believe that Europe is now more interested than ever in reaching an agreement on the revival of the JCPOA. The quantities missing from the market are an additional impulse for Iran itself to finalize the negotiations. Also, I believe that, in addition to very unfavorable alternatives to reaching an agreement, the energy benefit is one of the reasons for the interests of the US, especially now after the OPEC+ members at the last meeting decided to reduce production by 2 million barrels per day. The decision, which was poke in the eye for the United States, was not only Saudi’s short-term decision to keep the oil price high but a signal that Riyad has no intention to use its oil production to serve American interests. The world needs and will need Iranian oil.

1. In your opinion, to what extent Israel’s pressure on IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) and United States has contributed to the fact that an agreement has not been achieved so far? 

I do not believe Israel can exert any pressure on the IAEA, nor do I see the agency as one to be blamed for the negotiations stalemate. Tel Aviv cannot pressure the United States regarding the deal either. I think renewing the JCPOA is also in their best interest because the military solution they would prefer is risky, while another reasonable alternative is absent right now. Israelis probably would not attack Iran’s nuclear facilities alone, as in the scenario inferred from the recent statement of former Prime Minister Lapid stating they are not bound by the JCPOA. I see their constant objections as part of the US negotiating strategy. The threat of war is a form of pressure on Iran and perhaps delivering the message to Tehran that the US has been avoiding saying explicitly – in case of negotiations definitively collapse, and you go for nukes, the attack is inevitable. On the other hand, Israel’s displeasure also serves as a factor that facilitates the renewal of the agreement for Iran because, in the eyes of the Iranian public, the deal will be more acceptable if the arch-enemy is against it.

1. What is your assessment of new round of talks between Iran and International Atomic Energy Agency? Do they have the will to close the IAEA files on inspecting Iranian nuclear sites?

IAEA wants additional explanations about uranium particles found on undeclared sites to acquire continuity of knowledge that the Iranian nuclear program was always peaceful. So far, what we have is IAEA’s confirmation that it was the case during the period when the JCPOA was in force. If they suddenly give up on their demands, it would mean they went outside their standard procedures and resolved the case under political pressure. Luckily, for the JCPOA revival, Iran is not required to admit that its nuclear program once had a military dimension nor to provide additional information that would help the IAEA to conclude it was always peaceful.

1. What is the effect of United States Congress elections (assuming democrat’s victory or loss) on JCPOA’s destiny?

It can hardly have any effect. In any scenario, the majority necessary to adopt a treaty in Congress is unlikely. Iran will continue to have hardline opposition in American Congress. Also, the Biden administration and Democrats have instruments at their disposal to prevent the Republican’s disapproval. The best and only relevant outcome of the midterm elections on the JCPOA is that they are finished.

1.  Iran has repeatedly allowed access to agency experts within the framework of the NPT and JCPOA provisions, and the peacefulness of Tehran's nuclear activities has been confirmed 14 times by IAEA. However, the Israeli regime, despite having nuclear arsenal, has not accepted any framework for its nuclear programs and is not willing to allow access to agency officials. How do you evaluate this double standard? Do you agree that IAEA is acting as n obstacle in reaching an agreement?

I would not call it a double standard since, unlike Iran, Israel is not a state party to the NPT nor a state obliged by the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Yet, the Israeli nuclear arsenal is a sad circumstance that undermines the NPT regime, encourages further proliferation in the Middle East, and decisively prevents the possibility of establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in this region. If we want to talk about Israeli weapon possession as a double standard, it would be the US that employs them, not the IAEA. Americans struggle for global nuclear nonproliferation but still do nothing to condemn its ally, to say nothing of disarming it.

I do not see the IAEA as an obstacle in reaching an agreement but rather as a side that helps its realization and implementation. Hopefully, the US is not insisting on closing the investigation as a precondition for reviving the JCPOA. And I think Iran should not insist on it either, even though I understand its desire to use the momentum of its technological advances and the demise of the US credibility to gain more than in 2015. I perceive recent Tehran’s conditioning the deal revival with closing the IAEA’s files the way I see their insistence on removing the IRGC from the list of terrorist organizations or the US insistence to include ballistic missiles. These aim to increase the pressure on the other side while presenting something to trade in return for a concession.

1. Mikhail Ulyanov, Russian negotiator, has announced that the negotiations will be resumed in November. How practical this issue is? What is your evaluation of this negotiations in case of their resumption?

The next round(s) should be successful one(s) unless international politics further complicate. Negotiations stall for too long on some already agreed issues and those that will never be. Hopefully, the next round of talks should be relieved domestic pressure. The alternatives to the deal revival are war or further proliferation. Iranian economy and social stability need the abolition of nuclear-related sanctions. The US wants the Iranian nuclear program to halt. They both need peace. The world needs the JCPOA revival. There is no good alternative to that.